Южная Корея дистанцируется от США и критикует Израиль в рамках курса на стратегическую автономию

What South Korea's Israel Snub Means The Lee government is moving towards greater independence from the U.S. The Republic of Korea and the State of Israel were both founded in 1948, out of the wreckage of colonial empires upended by the Second World War. The two governments did not establish formal diplomatic relations until 1962, but they were on the same side for much of the Cold War, with Israel balancing against anti-American forces in the Middle East and South Korea doing the same in East Asia. Despite difficult security environments, each would not only survive, but grow into a prosperous, developed society. And, used to having their legitimacy questioned, both Israel and South Korea learned to assertively tout their democratic and capitalist credentials, as well as lay claim to long and illustrious histories. Their views of one another have also been broadly favorable, and in 2019 the two nations signed a free trade agreement to expand their economic ties. Which is why the South Korean government’s recent denunciations of Israel’s conduct stand out, even amidst the storm of criticism the latter government has faced since October 2023. These moves reflect not just the degree to which Israel’s international reputation has suffered, but also a broader shift in Seoul’s relationship with the U.S. In May, after two South Korean nationals were detained trying to reach the Gaza Strip aboard humanitarian aid boats, South Korea’s progressive President Lee Jae-myung made a strongly worded attack on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he labeled a war criminal. This followed Lee's earlier suggestions that the Israeli government’s conduct in Gaza resembled Nazi massacres during the Holocaust and—even more explosively for his South Korean audience—Japan’s “comfort women” system. Naturally, Israel’s Foreign Ministry objected, claiming that such statements trivialized the Holocaust, while conservatives at home said that Lee’s silence on North Korea’s human rights abuses revealed a double standard. But the pressure did little to change the Korean leader’s mind about Israel, and Lee went on to suggest Netanyahu could be arrested were he ever to visit South Korea. The Lee administration has faced criticism since its early days from those who asserted that it was aligned with China and North Korea, and that it intended to turn against the U.S., undo diplomatic progress with Japan, and sell out the country’s democracy to communism. Such allegations have been overblown from the start. Lee is, to be clear, a scandal-plagued politician with a questionable grasp on institutional independence (not that this wasn’t true of his predecessors). But he has also sought to maintain good ties with Japan and keep the United States engaged in peninsular affairs, even as his administration seeks stability in its relations with China. And while the Lee government did take tentative steps in its early days to lower tensions with North Korea, Kim Jong Un mostly responded with scorn, so intra-peninsular rapprochement has accordingly been put on the backburner. Though Lee does not want to abandon his country’s historic relationship with the United States, he does seek to increase South Korea’s ability to act independently in diplomatic, military, and economic matters. Soon after his inauguration, Lee announced plans to transfer the operational control of South Korean troops to Seoul in the event of war; he also released a public statement lambasting domestic critics of this move for their “submissive mindset.” (This is an amusing criticism coming from Lee, who in his second encounter with President Donald Trump presented him with a massive replica of a crown from the peninsula’s Silla era.) But Lee’s flattery of Trump is quite clearly strategic, as it has not only secured for his country a landmark (and, for South Korean progressives, long-desired) deal on the manufacture of nuclear submarines, but also papered over a number of persistent U.S.–South Korea bilateral disagreements on issues ranging from alleged Korean discrimination against U.S. businesses to the makeup of the UN Command that still polices the DMZ. It is in this context that President Trump’s recent decision to scale down U.S.-South Korea exercises must be understood. While much of the American press framed this negatively, seeing in it evidence of Trump’s affinity for dictators and disdain for alliances, Lee saw it as an opportunity. He praised the U.S. president’s decision, and used the occasion to reiterate his support for the accelerated development of nuclear subs and the expedited transfer of operational control (the latter of which Lee wants to see happen before he leaves office in 2030). In doing so, Lee avoids an open rupture with the White House, even as he signals a path toward greater self-reliance—and a desire to distance himself from Trump’s more unpopular impulses. Trump, it will be recalled, also justified this decision as punishment for Seoul’s refusal to get involved in the Iran War; the market turmoil and high oil prices caused by the war have imposed heavy costs on ordinary Koreans. Subscribe Today Get daily emails in your inbox For this reason, Lee not only feels comfortable in verbally sparring with Israel, but probably regards it as a canny political move. Despite the two nations’ historical common ground, Israel’s reputation among the South Korean public has not been good in recent years, particularly since the commencement of the Gaza war. Even those, inside or outside of Korea, who dislike Lee’s government and policies should recognize that, while he won’t be in office forever, this trend toward greater autonomy is likely to continue, especially as questions over U.S. reliability persist. Whatever a given administration’s attitude toward Israel, this shift toward greater autonomy for American partners is something Washington should continue to support—though preferably in a more tactful way.