Канада требует второго энергетического коридора на севере Британской Колумбии для снижения рисков

The Northern Advantage: Why Canada needs a second gateway beyond Lower Mainland The announcement in early July from the Prime Minister’s Office — confirming that Canada and Alberta will advance a new West Coast pipeline project proposal — marks an important step forward for the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB). Any expansion of egress to tidewater strengthens Canada’s energy position, improves market access and reduces long-standing bottlenecks that have constrained producers for decades. It is a positive development. But it does not solve the central strategic problem. Canada continues to rely almost entirely on a single corridor through Metro Vancouver for its crude exports. TMX, even with optimization toward roughly 1.2 million barrels per day, channels the nation’s most valuable commodity through a region facing a roughly 30 per cent probability of a significant earthquake within the next 50 years. The Lower Mainland’s geology — deep, saturated basin sediments prone to liquefaction — makes it uniquely vulnerable to catastrophic disruption. Dredging Burrard Inlet for larger tankers does not change this reality. It deepens it. Expanding West Coast egress is good. Relying solely on the Lower Mainland is foolish. Canada needs geographic redundancy. And geography offers a second option. Prince Rupert provides a deepwater port with meaningful economic, environmental and logistical advantages for transpacific energy trade. It is not a replacement for TMX — but it is the strategic complement Canada has lacked. Among major North American ports, Prince Rupert offers one of the shortest and most direct sailing routes to the principal markets of northeast Asia. Its northern latitude shortens the great-circle route across the Pacific, reducing sailing time to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China and the Philippines by days compared to departures from Vancouver. In global shipping, where fuel costs, emissions and vessel utilization determine competitiveness, distance is destiny. For Asian buyers, shorter transit times reduce inventory risk and improve supply reliability. For Canadian producers, they enhance competitiveness in markets where shipping economics increasingly influence sourcing decisions. In an era of tight margins and carbon-conscious procurement, a shorter, lower-emission route is not a minor advantage — it is a strategic one. The environmental benefits are equally significant. Marine shipping is a major source of global transportation emissions, and fuel consumption rises sharply with distance. A northern route that trims days off a transpacific voyage reduces greenhouse gas emissions by thousands of tonnes per vessel annually. Geography also gives Prince Rupert a natural maritime advantage. Unlike Burrard Inlet — a narrow, urbanized waterway requiring tug escorts, speed restrictions and complex navigational protocols — Prince Rupert opens directly onto the North Pacific. Tankers reach deep water within minutes. The route avoids bottlenecks, ecological choke points and community opposition that characterize southern shipping. It is a simpler, safer and more efficient corridor. None of this requires overstating the seismic profile of northern British Columbia. The region is not seismically quiet. The Queen Charlotte Fault, offshore from Haida Gwaii, produced Canada’s two largest recorded earthquakes — magnitude 8.1 in 1949 and magnitude 7.8 in 2012. The northern coast faces real seismic hazards — but they are different hazards. They do not involve the deep, liquefiable basin sediments that threaten Burrard Inlet. They do not expose a major metropolitan area with fragile infrastructure. And they do not create a single point of national failure. A northern route does not eliminate seismic exposure. It diversifies it. That is the strength of the argument. Any serious discussion of northern access must also address the Oil Tanker Moratorium Act (Bill C-48). The legislation prohibits large crude tankers along the stretch of coast that includes Prince Rupert and Kitimat, and it was a decisive factor in the cancellation of Northern Gateway. This month’s federal-provincial announcement reaffirmed the moratorium even as it advanced new West Coast pipeline development. This policy reality cannot be ignored. But it can be debated. C-48 was designed for a different era — one in which Canada’s crude exports were smaller, TMX was not yet complete and global energy security concerns were less acute. The legislation restricts access to the very deepwater ports that offer Canada the greatest strategic advantage in Asia. If Canada wishes to diversify its energy corridors, reduce dependence on a single seismic choke point, and strengthen its position in Asian markets, it must revisit the moratorium. That could mean amending it, replacing it with a modernized regulatory framework or identifying alternative northern destinations outside the restricted zone. And if British Columbia and the federal government remain unwilling to consider any northern alternative, Canada must acknowledge a geopolitical reality — Alaska is not bound by C-48. Ports such as Ketchikan sit just north of the moratorium boundary, offer deepwater access and operate under a U.S. federal government that has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to expand oil and gas infrastructure. The current administration has shown both an appetite for energy investment and a readiness to use strong leverage on its trading partners to achieve strategic goals. It is not a threat — it is a fact. If Canada chooses not to diversify its own corridors, others will gladly step into the role. The central point remains — expanding West Coast egress is positive, but concentrating it entirely in the Lower Mainland is strategically reckless. Prince Rupert offers a geographically distinct, economically superior and environmentally advantageous second gateway. It does not replace TMX. It complements it. And in doing so, it strengthens Canada’s ability to withstand the shocks — geological, economic or geopolitical — that will define the next half-century of global energy trade. David A. McLellan spent more than 30 years in energy and finance. He is a Senior Fellow at the Haultain Institute and a member of the board at Blackhawk Oil & Gas, FX Energy and Ascent Energy Ventures.