Сокращение поддержки хасидских семей в Израиле угрожает демографической устойчивости и экономике страны

Cutting support for large Haredi families would weaken Israel’s demographic resilience, economic future, and Jewish continuity Israel enters the final stretch of its election campaign against a turbulent backdrop. Israel’s war with Iran has yet to yield an agreement preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, the arrangement on the northern border still faces serious obstacles, and Hamas’ demilitarization is hardly around the corner. Yet for many politicians, the campaign’s defining issue is not these security and diplomatic challenges, but the “Haredi question.” The conflict over conscripting yeshiva students has prompted a broader reassessment of the relationship between Haredi society and the state. In this atmosphere, a policy paper presented by the Israel Democracy Institute at the 2026 Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society proposes reducing public support for Haredi families according to the number of their children. It suggests conditioning child allowances, day care subsidies, housing assistance, and child-related tax credits on maximizing earning capacity or civic participation. The paper distinguishes between protecting children’s basic needs and publicly funding what it calls a “high-fertility pattern.” This proposal is a step backward. It threatens one of Israel’s unique economic strengths while overlooking the real long-term danger: Not an excess of births, but a shortage. The demographic crisis is no longer a distant forecast. Fertility in the European Union has fallen to roughly 1.4 children per woman, well below the replacement level of 2.1. In Italy and Spain, it is near 1.2, while South Korea’s rate has fallen below one. These countries face aging populations, labor shortages, growing pressure on pension and health care systems, and diminishing prospects for long-term growth. Population decline can create a feedback loop. As populations shrink, the burden on younger generations grows, making it harder for young couples to raise families. Governments have tried to reverse the trend with little success. Many countries have turned to immigration as a stopgap. Yet immigration offers only a temporary solution, as immigrants tend over time to adopt the lower fertility rates of their host countries. It can also produce integration difficulties, tensions over national and religious identity, and political polarization. Europe is discovering that immigration may fill immediate labor shortages but cannot restore the social cohesion and intergenerational confidence weakened by family decline. Japan has chosen to limit immigration to preserve social cohesion but pays a heavy economic price as its population falls by hundreds of thousands each year. Against this backdrop, Israel is an anomaly. Its fertility rate remains close to three children per woman, making it the only Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development country safely above replacement level. This is not a structural weakness of the Israeli economy. It is a singular strategic advantage. Israel cannot afford complacency. Fertility is already trending downward, and OECD projections suggest it could fall to approximately 2.08 by around 2065 and decline further thereafter. Israel has also recently recorded unusually negative migration balances among its own citizens. Fertility remains closely connected to religious and traditional identity. According to the 2025 Haredi Society Yearbook, published by the Institute for Strategy and Haredi Policy, Haredi fertility stands at 6.2 children per woman. Central Bureau of Statistics data show a clear continuum: Approximately four children among religious Jewish women, between 2.5 and three among traditional women, and an average of 1.85 among secular Jewish women in 2022–2024, below replacement level. Similar disparities are evident among American Jews. Pew Research Center’s 2020 survey found that Jewish adults ages 40 to 59 had an average of 1.9 children. Orthodox Jews reported 3.3 children, compared with 1.4 among non-Orthodox Jews. Jews married to Jewish spouses reported 2.3 children, compared with 1.5 among those in interfaith marriages. These figures suggest that fertility is shaped less by government policy than by the values and preferences of different communities. Attachment to tradition, faith, and Jewish identity provides the foundation that enables the Jewish people to grow against prevailing Western trends. The willingness to bring children into the world and bear the personal and financial costs of raising them expresses more than loyalty to tradition. It reflects trust in family, community, and the possibility of a meaningful future for the next generation. High fertility is a form of optimism, a vote of confidence in the future. Jewish identity also teaches us to see ourselves as links in an intergenerational chain: To recognize what we received from previous generations and accept responsibility for passing that inheritance forward. This worldview encourages investment in children even in times of uncertainty. Israel’s unique fertility profile is one of its most important national assets, but it cannot be taken for granted. The right question is not how to make large families less economically viable, but how to create a society in which parents can raise children without forfeiting economic opportunity. Haredi society in Israel and the Diaspora has become a central engine of Jewish demographic growth. Its family culture is not an accidental product of poverty or government support; it stems from a deep commitment to family, continuity, and intergenerational responsibility. Israel’s current denial of day care subsidies to working Haredi mothers whose husbands have not regularized their military status risks sacrificing this asset to an ideological struggle. Whatever one’s position on conscription, using child care assistance as leverage against working mothers harms employment and transfers the cost to children and to Israeli society’s future. Child-related tax credits should reflect household realities and encourage employment by either parent. Child care costs should be recognized as expenses incurred in earning income. Israel need not choose between demographic vitality and economic prosperity. A young, expanding Haredi population can enlarge the future workforce, strengthen domestic demand, foster entrepreneurship, and help sustain an aging society. Realizing this opportunity requires investment in culturally adapted pathways to high-productivity employment: Advanced vocational training, technological education, employer partnerships, and professional advancement. The task is not to solve a “problem” called Haredi growth. It is to develop one of the country’s greatest human assets. A Jewish state confident in its identity should preserve its family ethos and ensure that the children who represent its future have every opportunity to grow, contribute, and thrive.