Северная Корея не достигла целей пятилетнего плана: рост импорта угля опровергает заявления о технологическом суверенитете

Successes and Challenges of North Korea’s Five-Year Plan for Economic Development: Assessment and Outlook North Korea held the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in February of this year, where it reviewed the Party’s and state’s activities over the past five years and set out priorities for the next five. Although the proceedings of the Party Congress were released through outlets such as Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the achievements and goals of the five-year plan for economic development were presented only in broad terms, without specific figures. Since June 2025, North Korean readouts of key meetings, including Party plenums, have grown even shorter, making it increasingly difficult to assess developments in the country’s economy. Fortunately, the press releases from the First Plenary Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), held in late March, disclosed key points of Kim Jong Un’s policy address and Premier Pak Thae Song’s report on the Cabinet’s work. These releases offered a clearer picture of the achievements of the 2021-2025 five-year plan and the goals set for 2026 to 2030, as well as the broader direction of future economic policy. However, official reports issued by North Korea’s state media tend to highlight positive outcomes that support regime propaganda. To gain an accurate understanding of the North Korean economy, it is therefore essential to look beyond the information presented—examining what is emphasized or omitted—and to read between the lines of these reports. This paper evaluates the achievements of the five-year plan for economic development (2021-2025) based on North Korean press releases and forecasts the direction of the new five-year plan (2026-2030). In particular, by examining the background behind the emergence of the “12 key targets” and the “20×10 policy for regional development”—which North Korea has highlighted as signature accomplishments of the current plan—it appears that the last plan period underwent changes or adjustments, which shaped future resource-allocation priorities and prospects.[1] Furthermore, regarding the 20×10 policy for regional development, assessments may differ depending on the criteria used to measure its performance, underscoring the need to evaluate the policy based on its intended objectives and the actual improvement of residents’ livelihoods, rather than market performance-based expectations. The Achievements of the Five-Year Plan for Economic Development (2021-2025): The 12 Key Targets and the 20×10 Policy for Regional Development The achievements of the five-year plan for economic development (2021-2025) were disclosed through press releases from the Ninth Party Congress, held in February 2026, and the first plenary session of the 15th SPA, held in March 2026. The press release from the Ninth Party Congress highlighted the 20×10 policy for regional development, the 12 key targets, the construction of 50,000 housing units in Pyongyang, and the construction of 110,000 housing units in rural areas nationwide as the major accomplishments of the five-year period. Kim Jong Un declared that the five-year plan had been fundamentally fulfilled, describing it as “the most significant achievement in the economic sector in more than 30 years.” Specific performance figures for the five-year plan can be found in North Korean Cabinet Premier Pak Thae Song’s report during the March SPA session, which focuses primarily on the 12 key targets. Where this reframing of plan goals came from is worth further examination. Sanctions against North Korea and the COVID‑19 pandemic served as the most significant hindrance to the North Korean economy during the recent five-year plan period (2021-2025). Exports continued to decline due to harsher UN sanctions since 2017, while imports fell sharply as a result of North Korea’s self‑imposed border closures aimed at keeping COVID‑19 out of the country. Consequently, North Korea’s foreign trade plummeted to near‑zero levels starting in 2020. Facing a shortage of fiscal resources due to the economic downturn, North Korean authorities issued Tonpyo—temporary money vouchers issued by the Central Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—in the second half of 2021. In particular, the state-reported outbreak and spread of COVID‑19 within the country from April 2022 prompted nationwide quarantine measures, causing the economy to face shortages of both raw materials and labor. The Bank of Korea estimated North Korea’s economic growth rate for 2022 at ‑0.2 percent. An analysis of the annual total number of industrial sectors that met their monthly economic plan targets—as reported in official North Korean press releases—shows a 43 percent decline, falling from 40 sectors in 2021 to 23 in 2022. The 12 key targets and the 20×10 policy for regional development emerged at this juncture. An analysis of the context surrounding official reports from North Korean state media suggests that, as the country faced a crisis triggered by COVID‑19, it scaled back the sectoral targets of its five-year plan to the 12 key targets. This mirrored what was previously known as the “10 major prospective goals for socialist economic construction,” which had disappeared from North Korean media in the 1980s. Furthermore, the country’s limited capacity was underscored by renewed references to the chollima movement of the 1950s, as well as other “patriotic and mass movements.”[2] From this point onward, North Korean state media replaced sectoral reporting on the five-year plan with the 12 key targets. The 20×10 policy for regional development, introduced in 2024, appears to have been one of the few areas in which the state could achieve visible results with the limited resources it could mobilize. This also aligned with the policy need to ease public discontent, as people’s livelihoods had deteriorated under COVID-19 containment measures. Due to fiscal constraints, only 20 regions were selected each year. However, construction targets—initially restricted to food-processing plants, clothing factories, and daily-necessities plants—expanded in 2025 to include general service centers, grain-processing facilities, and local hospitals, suggesting that the economic recovery has provided greater fiscal latitude. This shift is likely attributable to the increased trade with China following the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the wartime windfall resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war. These observations suggest that the sectoral economic development plans announced at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea were scaled back and refocused during the COVID-19 pandemic toward targets capable of yielding visible results through concentrated inputs of funds and effort, such as the 12 key targets and the 20×10 policy for regional development. Instances of adjusted or delayed plans can also be found in the recent past. Policy tasks adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in December 2019 were modified due to COVID‑19.[3] Construction of the Pyongyang General Hospital, which began construction in March 2020 with a target completion date of October that same year, was not finished until October 2025—five and a half years after groundbreaking. Similarly, the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, which began construction in May 2015 with a target completion date of April 2020, was not completed until June 2025. From this perspective, it is likely that the achievements of the five-year plan were evaluated against adjusted targets. Detailed plans for other sectors presented at the Eighth Party Congress—except for core industries such as electricity and metals, as well as housing construction and railway transport—may have been abandoned midway or fallen short. For instance, although the authorities claimed that nitrogen fertilizer production had increased 1.5 times compared to 2020, they made no mention of achievements during the Ninth Party Congress and the March SPA session regarding “C1 chemical industry,” a core task of the chemical sector. Despite the completion of the Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Plant in May 2020, no results were reported for the phosphatic fertilizer production task set under the five-year plan. Likewise, while cement production was said to have risen 1.4 times compared to 2020, the annual production target of 8 million tons announced at the Eighth Party Congress went unmentioned. This raises the question of whether North Korea truly “fundamentally accomplished” the goals of its five-year plan. Goals and Resource Allocation Priorities for the New Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) The core objective of the new five-year plan is to maintain the existing growth strategy centered on key industrial sectors while fostering advanced industries such as space technology and artificial intelligence. At both the Party Congress and the SPA session, Kim Jong Un emphasized the need for technological upgrades across the entire economy, including basic industrial sectors, and specifically highlighted the importance of enhancing production capacity in the metals, chemicals, electric power, and coal industries. Tasks were announced for economic sectors—including basic industries, construction, building materials, information and communications, energy, tourism, foreign economic relations, and agriculture—broadly consistent with the objectives set forth at the Eighth Party Congress. The importance of electricity and coal production was further emphasized, and a concrete target was set to build 80,000 housing units over four years—20,000 units annually—in mining regions nationwide through state investment. The advancement of the 20×10 policy for regional development was also included as a major task of the five-year plan. Although detailed sectoral tasks were not fully disclosed, press releases from the Party Congress, the SPA meeting, and the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Party Central Committee held in late June provide sufficient indications of the resource-allocation priorities in North Korea’s economic policy over the next five years. First, during the new five-year plan period, the North Korean authorities are expected to devote significant effort to completing Juche steel and C1 chemistry technologies. These technologies are critical because the domestic production of raw materials and inputs is central to building a self-reliant economy, which is a major part of North Korea’s economic development goals. It appears that the development of Juche steel production technology and C1 chemistry technology—key components of the metal and chemical industries prioritized during the previous five-year plan period—has not been completed. For example, there have been no follow-up reports since the December 2024 announcement regarding the completion of an “energy-saving oxygen-heat blast furnace” at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex; furthermore, increasing steel output through repairs and upgrades in the metal industry remains a key task, as highlighted during SPA session discussions.[4] Although the authorities claim that Juche steel production increased 3.2 times compared to 2020, there is still no evidence that the Juche steel production technology has been successfully established, given that coke imports—a catalyst used in steelmaking—rose to 74,000 tons in 2025, up nearly 115 percent from 34,000 tons in 2023.[5] Although the development of C1 chemistry technology was designated as a core task for the chemical industry at both the Seventh Party Congress in 2016 and the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, it remains a priority at the Ninth Party Congress, indicating that the technology is still incomplete. However, the report delivered by Premier Pak Thae Song at the March SPA session identified the “completion of construction projects to establish the C1 chemical industry” as a key task for the chemical sector, suggesting that some progress has been made. The sluggish progress in developing Juche steel and C1 chemistry technologies stems from shortages of technical capacity and financial resources. However, the recent strengthening of North Korea-Russia economic cooperation has increased the likelihood of securing the necessary technology and funding. Second, coal production remains a critical issue. At the SPA session, Kim Jong Un acknowledged that securing sufficient electricity and coal supplies is one of the most difficult challenges. During the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth WPK Central Committee held in late June, a “decision” was adopted emphasizing the development of the coal industry and the construction of housing in mining areas. Coal serves as both a raw material and an energy source for the North Korean economy; the steel, power generation, and chemical industries all rely on coal. The surge in coal demand appears to be primarily driven by the growth of the heavy and chemical industries, which has benefited from a recent wartime-driven expansion linked to the Russia-Ukraine war. According to the Bank of Korea, North Korea’s heavy and chemical industries are estimated to have grown for three consecutive years—8.1 percent in 2023, 10.7 percent in 2024, and 7.8 percent in 2025. Third, the 20×10 policy for regional development continues to be implemented. As discussed earlier, this policy was not part of the goals outlined in the five-year plan (2021-2025) presented at the Eighth Party Congress; it appears to have been introduced later as an alternative measure to help overcome the COVID‑19 crisis. Initially, the policy was intended to generate visible results by mobilizing available resources and to appease residents whose lives had been disrupted by pandemic control measures. However, as it began to show tangible outcomes and gained momentum, the policy subsequently became a core initiative for improving residents’ livelihoods. The financial burden is minimal because the policy utilizes domestically produced steel and cement and mobilizes military construction units whose labor comes at virtually no cost. Furthermore, its results are immediately visible, making it advantageous for showcasing achievements. Outlook and Implications The conditions for implementing the new five-year plan are assessed to have improved compared to the previous planning period. The COVID-19 pandemic, which had been the most significant constraint on the North Korean economy over the past five years, has been resolved, and the strengthened relations with China and Russia have increased the prospects for expanded economic cooperation. In particular, the foreign currency, technology, and equipment secured through cooperation with Russia are expected to contribute substantially to North Korea’s industrial reconstruction and the expansion of its production capacity. The 20×10 policy for regional development also appears likely to proceed without major difficulties. The products manufactured at local factories—such as basic food items like soybean paste and soy sauce—are produced using locally sourced raw materials. Judging from the packaging and contents of the products featured in the Rodong Sinmun, their quality does not appear to be particularly high. However, if the goal of the 20×10 policy for regional development is simply to meet residents’ basic needs with products of this level, the policy seems fully achievable given North Korea’s current circumstances. While some may anticipate the failure of this policy, its success or failure depends on the criteria used to evaluate it. If judged against the standards of high-quality, mass-produced goods produced through the advanced production technologies we commonly encounter, the outcomes of the 20×10 policy for regional development would indeed appear far from successful. However, if the benchmark is whether residents can be provided with sustainably improved living conditions relative to the past, there is no reason to be overly pessimistic about the prospects for meeting the construction targets and continuing to implement the policy. On the other hand, uncertainties also remain. If sanctions against North Korea persist, constraints on the procurement of equipment and parts could limit coal production and the development of key industries. Moreover, a shift in the currently favorable external environment, such as the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, could also affect North Korea’s fiscal conditions and industrial growth momentum. Under its new five-year plan, North Korea continues to prioritize key industries while concentrating national resources on selected areas according to strategic priorities. Therefore, when assessing the future performance of the North Korean economy, it is necessary to closely monitor not only growth rates and production indicators but also progress in these core tasks. In addition, the success of the new five-year plan is likely to depend heavily on the continuity and scope of economic cooperation with China and Russia. In particular, if cooperation with Russia leads to expanded access to equipment, technology, and financing, North Korea could make substantial progress in industrial reconstruction and production capacity expansion. Conversely, if sanctions against North Korea remain in place and external conditions shift, such as the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, significant constraints may emerge in executing the plan. Ultimately, the relationship with Russia appears to be a key variable in North Korea’s economic trajectory over the next five years, and the extent to which it can help restore the country’s industrial production capacity. - [1] The 20×10 policy for regional development, announced in January 2024 by Kim Jong Un, mandates the construction of industrial factories in 20 cities and counties per year over a 10-year period. The “12 key targets” are grain, electricity, coal, rolled steel, non-ferrous metals, nitrogen fertilizer, cement, timber, textiles, marine products, housing, and railway freight transport. Ahn Yun Seok, “북한 ‘알곡·전력·석탄 등 경제발전 12개 중요고지 무조건 점령해야’ [North Korea, We Must Unconditionally Achieve the 12 Key Targets for Economic Development, Including Grain, Electricity, and Coal],” SPN Seoul Pyongyang News, January 11, 2023, https://www.spnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=60417. - [2] Editorial, “사회주의애국운동,혁명적인 대중운동으로 충성과 애국의 전통을 더욱 빛내여나가자 [Let Us Further Glorify the Traditions of Loyalty and Patriotism Through the Socialist Patriotic Movement and Revolutionary Mass Movement],” Rodong Sinmun, January 24, 2023. - [3] North Korea announced that during the Party Politburo on April 11, 2020 “studied and discussed matters of adjusting and changing some policy tasks in the work of implementing the decisions” made at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventh Party Central Committee in December 2019. Hong, Min. “북한 당 정치국회의 및 제14기 제3차 최고인민회의 분석 [Analysis of the North Korean Party Politburo Meeting and the Third Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly].” Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) Online Series CO 20-06, April 14, 2020. - [4] “Discussion at the First Session of the 15th SPA: [We] Will Firmly Advance the Development of the Metallurgical Industry and Tenaciously Build the Country’s Steel Pillar — Deputy Kim Kwang Nam [최고인민회의 제１５기 제１차회의에서 한 토론 금속공업의 발전을 강력히 추진하여 나라의 강철기둥을 억척같이 세워나가겠다 김광남대의원],” Rodong Sinmun, March 24, 2026. - [5] Imports of coke—a catalyst used in steelmaking—totaled 73,455 tons, far exceeding both the 2018-2019 annual average of 28,887 tons and the 34,078 tons imported in 2023. Choi Jang Ho and Choi Yu Jeong, “2025년 북중 무역 평가: 국가 유통망의 복원과 무역 적자의 심화 [Assessment of 2025 North Korea-China Trade: Restoration of the National Distribution Network and Deepening Trade Deficits],” KIEP World Economy Today, Vol. 26, No. 7, March 18, 2026, https://www.kiep.go.kr/gallery.es?mid=a10102020000&bid=0003&list_no=12293&act=view.