Индия превращает стратегическую автономию в экспортный прорыв на мировом рынке вооружений

Countries are hedging their bets not only through diplomacy but through where they buy their weapons. As confidence in traditional security guarantees weakens and established arms suppliers face problems of cost, capacity, reliability or political acceptability, governments are looking for alternatives. For India, this search may prove as important as the growth of its own defence industry. India's defence exports have reached a record ₹38,424 crore, rising by more than 60 per cent in a single year. The government's target of ₹50,000 crore by 2029–30, once considered ambitious, now appears achievable well ahead of schedule. But the real opportunity is larger than the number. India is entering the global arms market just as geopolitical uncertainty is raising demand and pushing countries to diversify. Wars in Europe and West Asia, tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the weakening of arms-control arrangements have driven a global rearmament cycle. Donald Trump's transactional approach to alliances, economic pressure on partners as well as adversaries, and questioning of American security commitments have left governments less certain that old relationships will hold in the next crisis. For many middle powers, defence diversification is becoming a form of strategic hedging: widening the network of suppliers reduces dependence on any single great power while preserving room for manoeuvre. This creates an unusual opening: demand is rising, single-supplier dependence is riskier, and each of the four major supplier blocs has a distinct vulnerability. The United States dominates the global arms market, and the quality of American equipment is beyond doubt. The problem is access. American weapons are expensive, the Foreign Military Sales process is cumbersome, and delivery schedules for high-demand systems stretch over years. Political interference is a real danger, and in a major crisis smaller customers fall behind American and allied requirements in the production queue. Western Europe produces world-class equipment, but its industrial base remains fragmented. Production runs are limited, procurement is divided among national systems, and efforts to expand output have exposed shortages in explosives, propellants, skilled labour and manufacturing capacity. Political clearance from multiple capitals adds further friction. India cannot match the West across the full range of military technology. Many countries, however, need equipment that works, is affordable, supplied within reasonable timelines and can be maintained locally. This is the market India should target. Russia-substitution presents the clearest immediate opportunity. For decades, Moscow was the preferred supplier for countries seeking robust, relatively inexpensive weapons without Western political conditions. That position has weakened sharply. Russian arms exports fell by 64 per cent between 2016–20 and 2021–25, and its share of global exports declined from 21 per cent to 6.8 per cent. Russia's defence industry must now prioritise its own armed forces, leaving foreign customers uncertain over deliveries, spares, upgrades and payments. Large parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East still operate Soviet- and Russian-origin equipment. India understands this ecosystem better than almost any country outside Russia, having spent decades manufacturing, maintaining and integrating Russian-origin platforms. It can provide ammunition, components, upgrades and eventually replacement systems to countries seeking to diversify away from Russia without replacing entire inventories with expensive Western equipment. China is the more difficult competitor. It has enormous industrial scale, competitive pricing, state-backed financing. It can also combine arms sales with infrastructure projects and wider political relationships. But several countries have reasons to limit excessive dependence on Beijing, whether over reliability, after-sales support or the strategic influence that can accompany Chinese arms. India can occupy the space between these suppliers: cheaper than the West, more reliable than a Russia under wartime pressure, and politically more acceptable than China to countries wary of excessive dependence on Beijing. The Philippines' purchase of the BrahMos coastal defence system shows what is possible: a commercially important sale that gives a Southeast Asian partner a powerful coastal-defence capability and the basis for a deeper security relationship. The significance of such sales lies in the ecosystem they create: recurring military interaction and, over time, strategic familiarity. Training, maintenance, spares, ammunition and upgrades can bind armed forces together for decades. Defence exports should therefore be treated as part of foreign and security policy. India's defence co-operation ties across Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean should be linked directly to its export strategy, so that every missile, radar or patrol vessel sold anchors a long-term security relationship. For countries pursuing strategic hedging, cooperation with New Delhi diversifies relationships without requiring formal alignment with a great-power bloc. India's own tradition of strategic autonomy becomes a commercial and diplomatic asset. India's export future may lie less in glamorous platforms such as fighter aircraft, submarines and main battle tanks. These markets are expensive, politically competitive and dominated by established suppliers and opportunities lie in the middle of the military technology market. This includes missiles, rocket artillery, drones, counter-drone systems, radars, electronic warfare equipment and ammunition. Ammunition deserves particular attention. Recent wars have shown that even sophisticated militaries can exhaust stocks of artillery shells, rockets and missiles at rates far beyond peacetime assumptions. Industrial capacity to manufacture quickly and in sufficient numbers has become a strategic constraint. India already has a substantial base, producing 155 mm artillery ammunition, mortar bombs, rockets, explosives, propellants and shell components. These products lack the visibility of fighter aircraft, but global demand is enormous and recurring. India's opportunity in drones lies in the fastest-moving segment of the market: relatively affordable, software-intensive and expendable systems that can be produced in numbers and modified rapidly. This segment fits Indian strengths in engineering, software and relatively low-cost manufacturing. India has a broad ecosystem of manufacturers, component suppliers, software companies and integrators working on surveillance drones, loitering munitions and counter-drone systems. Dependence on imported sensors, electronics and propulsion remains a weakness, and large, long-endurance military drones are an area of limited competitiveness. Serious problems remain. India must prove that its companies can provide spares, maintenance, ammunition and upgrades throughout the life of exported systems. Export finance is another weakness: major arms exporters support sales with credit, sovereign guarantees and sustained diplomatic backing. The state must also assure quality, since reputation is fragile, without constricting exports through undue controls. India must also build technological depth rather than chase export numbers. Dependence on imported engines, advanced sensors and specialised materials will eventually limit growth. Export success without deeper technological capability would create scale without strategic resilience. The global arms market is entering a period of unusual disruption. America remains dominant but expensive and capacity-constrained; Europe is struggling to expand production; Russia is consumed by its own requirements; and China remains a strategically difficult partner for many. India's opportunity lies in becoming the preferred second or third defence partner for countries seeking to reduce dependence while preserving strategic autonomy. That requires combining affordable systems and reliable delivery with training, maintenance, finance and sustained political engagement. The ₹50,000 crore target should therefore be treated as a milestone, rather than the objective. The larger opportunity is to convert a period of geopolitical hedging into enduring defence relationships. Such windows do not remain open indefinitely. (Anil Raman is Head of Defence Fellowship and Research Fellow, Takshashila Institution.) Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication. Discover the latest Business News, Sensex, and Nifty updates. 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