Гана рискует потерять северные регионы из-за игнорирования угроз джихадистов

The Writer Northern Ghana is not ablaze, at least not at this moment. This reality has prompted successive administrations to perceive the Sahel threat primarily as an issue pertaining to Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and, at most, Benin. This comfort harbors peril, and time is of the essence. An assessment of the West African geographical region is concerning. In the context of Mali, the Malian junta governs less than fifty percent of the nation’s territory. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the coalition affiliated with al-Qaeda, exerts control over this area of the Sahel and even besieged Bamako in 2025. The military juntas in the Sahel have consistently referenced the inability of civilian administrations to manage jihadist insurgency as a rationale for their coups. What measures do they plan to implement to restrain the jihadists? They have sought security collaboration with Russia’s Africa Corps following the expulsion of French troops. Nonetheless, the outcomes remain unchanged. Notwithstanding the occurrence of this external involvement, the territory governed by jihadists in the Sahel has expanded since the coup d’états. JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province have advanced further south, and the Africa Corps have been associated with heinous acts against civilians, like the Moura massacre in Mali. The core structural issue remains unresolved. The mercenary troops provide regime safeguarding, resource exploitation, and do not ensure overall public safety. In exchange, these entities receive mining concessions as compensation for their security assistance. Consequently, a cycle of financial motivation fostering instability instead of security and stability is established and sustained. Thus, we are confronted with a situation where the juntas traded imperfect democratic accountability for a security partnership lacking any accountability, leading to a marked increase in terrorism. Analysts monitoring this region indicate a calculated advance southward into Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and northern Ghana by various factions aiming for the Atlantic coastline. The lethal assaults in northern Benin, together with the multitude of troops deployed at its northern border, illustrate the escalating price at stake. At Nyansa Institute, we believe in the capacity of Africans to meet difficulties head-on and provide homegrown answers to the numerous issues facing the continent, rather than relying on ineffective foreign interventions as seen in the Sahel region. In addressing the Sahel danger, we assert that Ghana should take the lead and do it with determination. Credit is Due but Motion is not Progress In Ghana, we have been fortunate to avoid proven assaults, with the exception of the attacks on our fellow citizens abroad in the Sahel. Nevertheless, Ghana has not been exempt from the militants who, according to various reports, have utilized Northern Ghana as conduits for smuggling fuel, weaponry, and mineral resources. Ghana’s present circumstances exhibit a self-satisfied perspective: it possesses efficient law enforcement, social cohesion, and a strong governance structure. A more accurate assessment indicates that it is fortune, geography, and a preliminary benefit that wanes with each passing month without addressing the fundamental problems. Disregarding the escalating menace and postponing action until the first strike would constitute the gravest error Ghana could do. Ghana deserves recognition for not remaining fully inactive in combating the menace from the Sahel. The nation has hosted the Accra Initiative, an agreement between Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. This security coalition has resulted in numerous apprehensions through collaborative operations, intelligence exchange, and a permanent secretariat located in Accra. Furthermore, the existing political administration has formulated a new strategy in response to the northern danger. A designated ambassador visits Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey to foster collaboration in addressing the menace. The January 2026 security summit established a framework for transnational prosecution and intelligence exchange among the nations. A $40 million Coastal States Stability Mechanism, supported by the US and Germany, alongside a domestic BORDER Project, is specifically designed to provide security in the north. Although none of these actions should be disregarded, they must not be misconstrued as sufficient to address the magnitude of the problem. Decisive Action and Leadership Required Ghana should be decisive in its regional leadership role and refrain from delaying essential tasks that are crucial for countering the imminent risk. Such tasks include urgent intervention in managing counterterrorism finance, addressing issues of governance at its peripheries, and cooperation with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The financing of counter-terrorism should not be considered a mere afterthought. A report from a UN delegation to the Northeast and Upper East areas of Ghana should keep the government officials awake. The report claims that authorities comprehend the danger we face thoroughly, but they are severely lacking in equipment, training, and legal jurisdiction to take meaningful action. As an illustration, both fertilizer and fuel persist as components of improvised explosives, but their transit within these areas occurs with minimum tracking. This type of vulnerability is what militant groups capitalize on, yet it is also the sort of vulnerability that is less expensive to address than complex operations. The government ought not to regard our northern border as a security issue but rather a governance gap. The scholarly discourse regarding the proliferation of insurgency highlights the significant lack of state involvement in delivering services, resolving disputes, and offering economic prospects in such peripheral territories, while its sporadic military presence undermines its credibility and claims to authority. This phenomenon has been noted in Mali, where jihadists impose taxes and govern with territorial rights. Ghana’s border communities seem to recognize this oversight. They must be allocated resources as a national imperative. The BORDER Project and CSSM represent progress in the appropriate direction. The government ought to interact with the AES juntas devoid of emotional bias. Fortunately, the present administration’s communication with Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey is a positive step. Disregarding the existence of governments with genuine geographical authority is not a viable counter-terrorism strategy. Nonetheless, the appearance of discussions lacking actionable agreements and genuine collaborative intelligence exchanges is simply diplomatic performance. Ghana is among the few entities in our region sufficiently respectable to connect ECOWAS and AES. Such access holds value solely when it is utilized for results rather than merely for relationships. The Window Is Not Permanent The timeframe for Ghana to respond to this threat at its border and within the region as a leader is not indefinite. It would be lamentable to contemplate the unseized chances in tackling the impending dangers. Benin treated the cautionary indicators as insignificant background noise, and we are not oblivious to the repercussions. A substantial commitment to our northern border communities, the creation of a swift response mechanism via the Accra Initiative, and the rectification of the financing loopholes highlighted by the United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that exacerbate northern tensions must be carried out without fail. The future of Ghana will be determined more by the operational efficacy of the existing institutions such as the Accra Initiative, the BORDER Project, and the AES channel it has engaged, including their funding and staffing, rather than by any singular, momentous decision. The threat from the Sahel is not theoretical. It is several hundred kilometers to the south. Nonetheless, Ghana has several advantages—democratic frameworks, institutions, and soft power—that should be leveraged to counter the onslaught initiated by the extremists. It owes this to its own survival and to those who look up to Nkrumah’s black star as a guiding figure. Samuel Koranteng Adjei is a risk management and finance professional with experience across banking and financial services in Ghana, Germany and Nigeria. He is the founding Managing Director/CEO of Aztec Microfinance Bank Limited, Nigeria, a Commonwealth Scholar, and a PhD candidate in Finance at Maastricht University. Email address: [email protected] The Nyansa Institute for Strategic Dialogue provides a platform for thought leaders, practitioners, and experts to engage on emerging policy, economic, governance, and security issues. Through constructive dialogue and strategic partnerships, the Institute seeks to generate ideas that contribute to informed decision-making and effective public policy. Headquartered in Accra with a regional outlook, NISD aspires to become a leading platform for policy dialogue, combining intellectual depth with practical relevance to support stronger institutions, better policy choices, and improved outcomes for citizens. By Samuel Koranteng Adjei, Executive Director, Nyansa Institute for Strategic Dialogue