ЕС возрождает проект «Дезертек» для производства солнечной энергии в Сахаре

In its current energy distress, the European Commission is reaching for a project that quietly disappeared into the drawer a decade ago. As a stripped-down version of “Desertec,” a new solar initiative is intended to produce electricity in the Sahara for Europe. A European Union zombie is about to be resurrected -- at least parts of its political carcass. Under the unwieldy project name T-MED (Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean-Tech Cooperation Initiative), the European Union is planning a kind of revival of the Wüstenstrom project Desertec, which failed a decade ago. Desertec, as some may still remember, was conceived as a century-defining European energy project: a bridge between the sun-rich Sahara, European capital investment, and an integrated regional energy economy, including knowledge transfer to structurally weaker regions -- et voilà: cheap electricity for Europe’s energy-hungry industry and its, as it is now called, climate-destructive consumers. At the time, Desertec was planned with an investment volume of around €400 billion. The green “Global Gateway,” as the North Africa segment of the T-MED initiative is now called, must start with significantly less financial backing. However, that does not mean Brussels is not heavily promoting this new offspring of its green subsidy machinery. €25 billion are to be mobilized via loan guarantees, price commitments, and the usual funding mechanisms across energy infrastructure and hydrogen production. The plan foresees 100,000 well-paid jobs in the region -- Brussels-style projections and accounting experiments from the fantasy world of bureaucracy. In general, the EU has set its sights on expanding energy policy relations with North Africa. Understandably, it is trying to gradually reduce its dependence on the United States in the field of LNG imports. But can this really be achieved through overpriced intermittent electricity? “Stay the course” appears to be the motto of the hour. Already in the early 2030s, the South H2 Corridor is scheduled to be operational -- a roughly 3,300-kilometer hydrogen pipeline that would repurpose existing natural gas infrastructure. Through it, hydrogen produced in Tunisia and Algeria would be transported via Italy and Austria to Germany. Green is the electricity that is supposed to flow through this Africa-Europe corridor -- wishful thinking accompanies the project from the very beginning. On the drawing boards of central planners, everything always appears logical, simple, and without alternatives. Since EU financial resources appear limited, Brussels is only acting as a guarantor in this renewed desert project, providing €5 billion in credit guarantees as a backstop for potential investors. By 2035, the remaining funds are expected to be mobilized to build around 15 gigawatts of installed solar and wind capacity in North Africa and feed it into Europe’s still-nonexistent transmission infrastructure. The fundamental difference compared to Desertec: the new iteration relies on an orchestrated investment framework. EU guarantees, funds from the European Investment Bank, and private capital are expected to mobilize additional private investment. A form of nudging with the subsidy bucket, one might say. The central partner of the initiative is to be the Moroccan state, where industrial structures already exist through projects such as Ouarzazate. A concrete start of preparatory infrastructure work is still not in sight; bilateral agreements and regulatory frameworks are missing to provide investors with legal certainty. Brussels has mentioned 2027 or 2028 as a possible starting point. However, such vague timelines are familiar from other major projects, such as the digital euro: between planning and implementation there are always gaps that resemble more the distance between the Atlantic coasts than the Strait of Gibraltar, which must be crossed logistically in the case of the desert project. The African electricity project promoted by Brussels gives the impression that it is mainly about distributing existing budget funds -- otherwise how could one explain the revival attempt of a project that already failed? If it were truly promising, would one not expect the debt-friendly EU to issue a new green Africa bond? If the project were genuinely viable, Brussels would not hesitate to push itself and the member states deeper into debt. One counterpoint is crucial: the planned 15 gigawatts of capacity would, in a theoretical demand calculation, cover the electricity consumption of around 10 million households -- assuming, of course, that parallel infrastructure exists to provide baseload power to balance the volatility of renewables. With a total European electricity consumption of around 3,000 terawatt-hours per year, expectations should remain modest, even in the unlikely case that the project ever reaches actual production and integration into the European grid. The question of financing the necessary transmission infrastructure -- high-voltage direct current lines crossing the Mediterranean or running along its seabed -- adds yet another fiscal challenge that is rarely addressed. It would be the euphemism of the century to describe European energy policy as merely misguided or confused. In reality, after years of ecologically driven central planning, the outcome is so damaging that European industry has lost any hope of global competitiveness. In effect, the desert project appears to be little more than a self-promotional campaign -- a media-oriented policy failure that ultimately showcases the collapse of European energy policy on an international stage. One can only be grateful that, most likely, hardly anyone is paying close attention anymore. Image: Pixabay