Пентагон рассматривает частичное восстановление программы по снижению гражданских жертв после резкого сокращения при Хегсетхе

Most readers assume a Defense Secretary’s staffing decisions get made in rooms full of agreement. The internal record from the first months of Pete Hegseth’s tenure suggests something more striking: every command he consulted argued for preserving an operational Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response capability, but Hegseth gutted the program anyway. The details matter. Hegseth presented commanders with three options: cut 65% of the staff while keeping the broader effort operational, retain only a small central office, or eliminate the program. Nine commanders selected the first option, while leaders of two other commands rejected all three and requested that the full program be maintained. This was not a unanimous vote against every reduction. It was, however, a unanimous rejection of reducing CHMR to a small Washington office or eliminating it altogether. That distinction preserves the central finding without overstating what the commanders recommended. The Pentagon formalized CHMR in 2022 after two decades of operations in which civilian casualties repeatedly undermined missions, alliances and public trust. The program placed personnel within major regional commands to improve information about civilian activity, support targeting decisions and investigate harm after strikes. Before the cuts, the wider effort involved just under 200 people. Its Virginia-based Civilian Protection Center of Excellence had an annual budget of about $7 million, while civilian-protection work across the combatant commands was estimated at roughly $80 million. The reduction happened in stages. By the time U.S. attacks on Iran began in 2026, ProPublica reported that the program had fallen to around two dozen people, some of them working only part time. Central Command, which had previously maintained 16 CHMR positions, was left with one person. The first major military operation of Hegseth’s tenure was the spring 2025 campaign in Yemen. Iran followed in 2026, by which time the civilian-harm program had been reduced much further. Civilian casualties do not automatically prove that a mitigation program failed or that staffing cuts caused a particular targeting error. They do, however, create exactly the operational, legal and political problems that military leaders had argued CHMR was designed to reduce. Central Command made that argument in operational terms. A memo reviewed by ProPublica warned that scaling back the program would increase the risk of target misidentification and reduce awareness of conditions on the ground. Another defense official told the outlet that resistance from combatant commanders was the reason any part of the program survived. Hegseth publicly expressed a different view of constraints on military operations. Addressing generals and admirals at Quantico, he promised “no more politically correct and overbearing rules of engagement”. At the Army War College in April 2025, he described the Yemen campaign as “a clear, limited mission executed with ruthlessness, full stop”. CHMR staffing and rules of engagement are not the same thing. Still, ProPublica’s reporting indicates that Hegseth viewed the civilian-protection effort as part of a broader approach he considered incompatible with maximum lethality, while commanders viewed it as a tool that made lethal operations more accurate and effective. The consequences of the Yemen campaign soon became part of the public record. The Pentagon’s 2025 annual civilian-casualty report assessed that U.S. operations in Yemen killed 153 civilians and injured 243. Airwars separately said that two of the strikes ranked among the deadliest for civilians that the Pentagon has acknowledged in modern warfare. The Iran campaign brought a still more devastating incident. ProPublica reported that a U.S. strike hit Shajarat al-Tayyiba Primary School in Minab, killing more than 100 children. Preliminary investigation findings described by the outlet, but not yet released publicly, reportedly pointed to outdated intelligence. The incident generated demands for answers from Congress. On April 19, 2026, 11 senators wrote to Hegseth about the reduction of civilian-harm programs, the Minab strike and other civilian casualties in Iran. The chronology raises an urgent question, but it does not settle causation. Commanders had warned that reducing CHMR would increase the risk of target misidentification, and preliminary findings later reportedly linked the Minab strike to outdated intelligence. The public record does not establish whether fuller CHMR staffing would have prevented that strike. The Pentagon is now considering a partial revival. ProPublica reports that an April 2026 proposal from policy chief Elbridge Colby would rebuild CHMR with 70 full-time personnel and allow regional commands to restore civilian-harm teams. That proposal has not yet returned the program to its former strength. Seventy positions would represent roughly 35% of the previous staffing level, more than the two dozen remaining after the cuts but far below the earlier total of just under 200. The compromise number captures the unresolved argument. Military commanders have consistently framed civilian-harm mitigation as part of operational effectiveness, while Hegseth has publicly emphasized fewer constraints and greater authority for warfighters. The work performed by CHMR personnel includes mapping civilian presence, assessing operational risks, reviewing reports of harm and supporting investigations. Those functions do not determine whether a strike is launched, but they affect the information commanders have when making that decision and the military’s ability to understand what happened afterward. The legal obligations surrounding civilian protection do not disappear when staffing changes. The law of armed conflict and Pentagon directives still require distinction, proportionality and feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm. What can change is the institution’s capacity to apply those requirements consistently, investigate failures and learn from them. The record therefore supports a narrower but still consequential conclusion. Hegseth sought the views of senior commanders, every command argued for preserving an operational civilian-harm capability, and he imposed much deeper cuts. Later casualties and congressional scrutiny placed those decisions under new pressure, and the Pentagon began considering a smaller version of the program. That is not proof that one staffing decision caused every tragedy that followed. It is evidence that commanders anticipated serious operational risks, expressed those concerns before the cuts and are now supporting an effort to rebuild part of what was lost.