Болгария: парадокс интеграции в ЕС и проблемы внутреннего государства

Bulgaria’s European paradox From Schengen and the euro to brain drain and the concept of “imam chovek”, Bulgaria’s recent successes reveal a deeper contradiction: a country more integrated into Europe than ever, yet still struggling to build the state many citizens want. July 6, 2026 - Mathieu Lemoine - Articles and Commentary In Sofia today, you can board a tram or trolleybus and pay simply by tapping your bank card. Bulgaria uses the euro, belongs fully to Schengen, and has gained unprecedented cultural visibility in recent years. Yet many Bulgarians still joke that the most important administrative document is not an ID card, but the concept of “imam chovek” – “I have someone.” This contradiction captures modern Bulgaria better than any economic indicator. The country has rarely looked more European than it does today. Full Schengen membership, euro adoption, the international success of Georgi Gospodinov’s Time Shelter, and the legacy of Plovdiv’s year as European Capital of Culture all point in the same direction. Bulgaria has completed much of the journey that began with the end of communism. Yet the experience of many citizens tells a different story. Bulgaria has moved closer to Europe’s institutional core faster than it has transformed the everyday functioning of its own state. Formal integration has advanced rapidly, while public trust in institutions, political accountability and administrative predictability have evolved more slowly. This is Bulgaria’s European paradox. Bulgaria’s story is not one of failure. It is one of asymmetry. The country has achieved many of the objectives of post-communist integration, while some of the domestic reforms meant to accompany that process remain incomplete. Bulgaria has become more European in legal and institutional terms, but not always more predictable, transparent or accountable in daily life. There is a cultural shorthand for this reality. Bulgarians often refer to the “Bai Ganyo” mentality, named after Aleko Konstantinov’s famous satirical character. Opportunistic, adaptable and cynical, Bai Ganyo survives by navigating systems rather than reforming them. More than a century after his creation, many Bulgarians still invoke him when discussing politics, administration and public life. Another expression captures the same phenomenon even more directly: “imam chovek”, which literally means “I have someone.” Popularized by the rapper and politician Itzo Hazarta (real name Hristo Petrov), the phrase refers to the informal networks that often mediate access to opportunities, services and influence. Need a document processed quickly? A recommendation? A favour? “I have someone.” It is a joke, but one rooted in a social reality many Bulgarians immediately recognize. This is where the European project encounters its limits. Joining the European Union was never meant to be only a geopolitical achievement. It was also supposed to transform the relationship between citizens and the state through stronger institutions, impartial administration and the rule of law. While Bulgaria has made substantial progress, many citizens still perceive a gap between formal rules and everyday practice. Political instability has reinforced these concerns. Since 2021, Bulgaria has experienced a succession of elections, caretaker governments and fragile coalitions. Corruption remains one of the dominant lenses through which public life is interpreted. Debates surrounding the politician Delyan Peevski, long associated by critics with oligarchic influence and state capture, continue to shape discussions about power and accountability. More recent controversies, including the politically charged case involving the Varna Mayor Blagomir Kotsev, have further fuelled public scepticism regarding institutional neutrality. This mistrust affects far more than politics. It shapes how citizens view courts, prosecutors, local government, public procurement and the use of European funds. Roads are built, public buildings renovated and programmes launched, yet many Bulgarians continue to question whether institutions operate fairly and transparently. The pressure on dissenting voices deepens this challenge. Bulgaria still benefits from courageous journalists, civic activists and independent experts. Yet investigative journalism often remains vulnerable to economic pressure, intimidation and legal harassment. When exposing corruption carries personal or professional risks, democratic accountability inevitably suffers. At the same time, Bulgaria is not stagnant. Sofia’s public transport network illustrates a different reality. Modernized trams and trolleybuses, contactless payment systems and expanding urban infrastructure demonstrate that public services can improve. The problem is not an absence of capacity. It is the uneven distribution of success. This unevenness is visible in the economy as well. Bulgaria’s integration into European markets has brought investment, growth and consumer choice. Yet many sectors remain heavily dependent on foreign capital and external decision-making. For many citizens, Europe is experienced not only through institutions but through foreign-owned banks, supermarket chains, employers and labour markets. Regional connectivity offers another example of unrealized potential. Bulgaria’s geography should be one of its greatest strengths. Positioned between the European Union, the Western Balkans, Türkiye and the Black Sea, the country is ideally placed to serve as a regional bridge. Yet infrastructure often fails to match this strategic location. Roads, railways, flights and border crossings are not merely technical issues. They shape economic opportunities, cultural exchanges and political relationships. Projects such as Rail Corridor VIII matter not only because they facilitate trade, but because they determine whether Bulgaria can transform its geography into influence. Russia adds a further layer of complexity. Unlike in Poland or the Baltic states, Bulgarian attitudes toward Russia cannot be understood solely through contemporary geopolitics. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 remains central to Bulgaria’s national narrative. The battles of Shipka and Pleven, as well as monuments dedicated to Russian soldiers and figures such as General Skobelev, continue to occupy an important place in public memory. This historical gratitude does not necessarily translate into support for the Kremlin. Yet it helps explain why debates about Russia remain emotionally and politically more complex than elsewhere on NATO’s Eastern Flank. Bulgaria’s relationship with Russia is shaped not only by current security concerns, but also by historical memory. The country’s demographic trajectory presents another challenge. Bulgaria’s population has declined from nearly nine million people at the end of the communist period to roughly 6.4 million today. Low birth rates, ageing and large-scale emigration have transformed the country’s social landscape. For many families, European integration was first experienced through departure. Students left for universities abroad. Professionals built careers elsewhere. Seasonal workers joined the familiar “brigades” seen across Western Europe or the United States, earning abroad what they struggled to earn at home. These movements expanded opportunities, but they also normalized absence. The roots of this migration lie partly in the turbulent transition of the 1990s. Hyperinflation, banking crises and the overnight destruction of personal savings left a lasting mark on public consciousness. For many Bulgarians, distrust of institutions is not merely political. Instead, it is historical and deeply personal. Today, the government has recognized the demographic challenge and launched programmes designed to encourage Bulgarians abroad to return. Yet attracting returnees requires more than incentives. Many emigrants left not only because of salaries but because they sought predictability, meritocracy and confidence in public institutions. The question is whether Bulgaria can offer those conditions today. None of this should obscure the country’s achievements. Bulgaria is wealthier, more open and more secure than it was before joining the European Union. Its cities are changing. Its cultural influence is growing. Its civil society remains active. The country’s democratic story is unfinished, but it is not hopeless. For the European Union, Bulgaria offers an important lesson. Integration can anchor countries geopolitically, but it cannot by itself create trust. Membership, funding and formal compliance matter, but they do not automatically generate institutions that citizens believe in. For Bulgaria’s leaders, the challenge is different. The country no longer needs to prove that it belongs to Europe. That question has largely been settled. The task now is to make European integration meaningful at home through stronger institutions, more predictable governance and greater public confidence. Bulgaria’s future will be determined less by the borders it has crossed than by the state it is still trying to build. Mathieu Lemoine is a governance, rule of law and elections specialist who has worked across Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the South Caucasus and Central Asia with international organizations including the OSCE, USAID and UNDP. New Eastern Europe is reader-supported. 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