Эксперт: политический курс Тайваня определяется структурными ограничениями и конкуренцией сверхдержав

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Wayne Tan – professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), where he also serves as director of the Center for Indo-Pacific Strategy and Non-Traditional Security – is the 521st in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.” How would you characterize Kuomintang (KMT) party chair Cheng Li-wun’s political narrative regarding Taiwan’s autonomy and sovereignty? Political narratives should not be confused with strategic reality. One of the central arguments in my recent work is that Taiwan’s room for strategic maneuver is increasingly constrained by structural forces beyond the control of any Taiwanese political leaders. Whether one belongs to the KMT or the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party], Taiwan operates within an international system shaped by the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China. Viewed from this perspective, Cheng Li-wun’s narrative can be understood as a paradoxical attempt to maximize Taiwan’s autonomy through “self-restraint” rather than “strategic proactivity.” Unlike narratives that seek to reinforce sovereignty through greater international visibility, Cheng appears to argue that Taiwan’s de facto autonomy is best preserved by lowering the probability of military conflict and maintaining channels of communication with Beijing. However, it is important to realize that any genuine risk of military conflict across the Taiwan Strait arises not from Taiwan’s conduct, but from Beijing’s persistent use of gray-zone coercion, which has steadily eroded the stability of the status quo. Taiwan has never been the problem. Rather, it is the current Xi Jinping administration that has repeatedly generated instability through increasingly coercive actions in the region. For this reason, I would be cautious about attributing excessive importance to Cheng’s political narrative. Taiwan’s leaders possess agency, but it is constrained agency. They can influence tactics, manage crises, and shape domestic political debate. What they cannot do is fundamentally alter the structural forces driving U.S.-China rivalry. As long as China continues to rise and the United States remains committed to preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in Asia, Taiwan will remain one of the principal arenas of great-power competition. That reality is largely independent of which political party governs Taiwan or how its leaders frame questions of autonomy and sovereignty. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Cheng’s rhetorical platform? The strength of Cheng’s rhetoric is that it recognizes an uncomfortable reality often overlooked in Taiwan’s domestic political debate: military conflict would be catastrophic regardless of who prevails politically. In this sense, her discourse appeals to prudence rather than ideology. From an international relations perspective, reducing misperception and preserving diplomatic communication are entirely rational objectives. Thomas Schelling demonstrated decades ago that deterrence and communication are complementary rather than contradictory. Stability depends not only upon military capability but also upon credible signaling. However, recognizing the reality mentioned above is not the same as overcoming it. The central weakness of Cheng’s platform lies in the implicit assumption that greater self-restraint or expanded dialogue can substantially reduce China’s ambitions toward Taiwan. That assumption is difficult to sustain when viewed through the logic of realism. If Beijing regards Taiwan as indispensable to its long-term regime security, legitimacy, and regional dominance, then changes in Taiwan’s rhetoric are unlikely to alter decision-makers’ fundamental objectives in Beijing. This is the critical distinction between tactical tension reduction and strategic conflict resolution. Diplomatic engagement may lower the probability of accidental escalation in the short run, but it does not eliminate the underlying security competition. The continued existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan) represents an enduring legitimacy challenge for the government of PRC. As long as two competing political authorities each claim to represent a state legally, Beijing cannot fully consolidate its political legitimacy. This zero-sum rivalry has shaped the strategic calculations of every Chinese Communist Party leader since 1949 and helps explain why the Taiwan issue has remained central to PRC’s grand strategy. Compare and contrast the notion of Taiwan’s national identity between the KMT and the DPP. To be sure, the two parties articulate different political narratives. The DPP increasingly defines Taiwan as a distinct democratic country whose legitimacy derives exclusively from the will of the Taiwanese people. The KMT, by contrast, continues to place greater emphasis on the constitutional framework of the ROC and generally advocates maintaining channels of communication with Beijing as a means of preserving stability. These differences matter for domestic elections and political discourse. But from the standpoint of international politics, they are of secondary importance. Neither party can alter the structural realities that dominate Taiwan’s security. Beijing has made clear that preventing Taiwan’s permanent separation is a core political interest. The United States, meanwhile, views Taiwan as a critical component of its strategy to prevent Beijing from being regional hegemony. Those are the forces that matter. Taiwan’s geographic location, the military balance across the Strait, and the intensity of Sino-American competition define the boundaries within which any Taiwanese government must operate. Who are the principal audiences of Cheng’s political messaging? Domestically, Cheng’s message primarily addresses voters who prioritize peace, economic stability, and risk reduction over ideological confrontation. These voters tend to evaluate cross-strait relations through practical rather than symbolic considerations. A second audience consists of Taiwan’s business community, particularly firms deeply integrated into regional production networks. For these actors, geopolitical uncertainty translates directly into economic costs. Internationally, Cheng’s messaging also speaks to observers in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, and Southeast Asia by signaling that Taiwan’s democratic system contains multiple perspectives rather than a single unified position. How do Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo view Cheng’s agenda? Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo will judge Cheng not by her rhetoric but by whether her policies advance or hinder their strategic interests. Beijing may welcome dialogue, yet it will not abandon its objective of bringing Taiwan under control. Washington will support any Taiwanese leader who strengthens deterrence and resists Xi’s regime domination, regardless of party affiliation. Tokyo views Taiwan through the logic of balance of power: Beijing’s takeover would fundamentally undermine Japan’s security. The crucial point is that Taiwan’s domestic politics cannot override geopolitical realities. In an anarchic international system, small states possess agency, but only within limits imposed by great-power competition. Taiwan’s future therefore will be shaped primarily by the evolving balance of power between Washington and Beijing, not by the preferences or personalities of Taiwanese politicians.