Израиль рассматривает Шри-Ланку как площадку для трilateralного сотрудничества с Индией

While Sri Lanka is not an obvious priority in Israel’s Asian policy, with India, Japan, and Singapore receiving far more strategic attention, it has considerable potential because of its location, its development needs and the direction its relationship with India is heading. During my recent visit, this became particularly clear. The island sits close to major sea lanes and within India’s immediate maritime security environment. For New Delhi, Sri Lanka is not simply another neighbor. Access to its ports and maritime infrastructure carries significance beyond bilateral relations. Indian concerns about China’s research and survey vessels illustrate this sensitivity. The issue is not simply Chinese commercial investment. New Delhi is also attentive to the possibility that external actors could gain access to ports, infrastructure, or oceanographic information with potential dual-use applications close to India’s coastline. Sri Lanka should not be reduced to another arena of India-China competition. Colombo has strong reasons to maintain relations with multiple partners, including China. Any Israeli strategy framed primarily around containing Beijing would misunderstand Sri Lanka’s interests and risk narrowing the space for cooperation. India’s own approach has become broader. During Sri Lanka’s economic crisis in 2022, New Delhi provided some $4 billion in assistance. Since then, the relationship has moved beyond emergency support toward longer-term cooperation in energy, infrastructure, digital connectivity, trade, and security. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s April 2025 visit marked an important step. The two countries signed agreements on electricity interconnection, digital transformation and development, and, for the first time, a formal memorandum of understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation. India, Sri Lanka and the United Arab Emirates also agreed to cooperate on developing Trincomalee as an energy hub. The defense agreement did not create bilateral security cooperation: India and Sri Lanka already had substantial ties in training, naval visits, exercises, and capacity-building. Yet the MoU gave this relationship a more formal framework. Cooperation includes joint exercises, maritime surveillance, hydrography, capacity-building, and the provision of defense platforms and assets. SLINEX is a regular bilateral naval exercise, and in April 2026 the two navies conducted their fourth bilateral diving exercise in Colombo, including complex underwater operations. Sri Lankan personnel have also participated in India’s wider IOS Sagar initiative. Taken together, these developments suggest that India is progressively embedding Sri Lanka within a wider Indian-led maritime security architecture. This does not mean that Colombo is surrendering its strategic autonomy or that India is constructing a formal alliance system. India continues to prefer flexible partnerships. But New Delhi increasingly sees regional security as something built through training, maritime domain awareness, interoperability, capacity-building, and institutional cooperation. For Israel, this creates an opportunity that deserves attention. For years, Israel-India relations have been viewed primarily through defense cooperation, technology, and an expanding strategic convergence. Those ties remain important. But as India’s regional role grows, Israel should consider whether that partnership can also provide a basis for selective cooperation with third countries. Sri Lanka offers a useful test case; there is evidence of Sri Lankan interest in expanding relations with Israel. In August 2026, Sri Lanka’s new ambassador to Israel identified agricultural technology, defense, and trade as areas in which Colombo would like to deepen cooperation. Agriculture is an obvious starting point. India and Israel have spent years developing Centers of Excellence that combine Israeli agricultural technology with Indian institutions, local adaptation, and training. A similar trilateral initiative could bring together Israeli technology, Indian implementation experience, and Sri Lankan development priorities. The potential goes further. Maritime security is one area where Israeli capabilities could complement rather than compete with India’s regional role. Israel has relevant experience in sensors, electro-optics, unmanned systems, and maritime infrastructure protection. Cybersecurity and artificial intelligence are also important as ports, energy facilities, and digital systems become connected and vulnerable. Israel’s comparative advantage lies not in establishing a military presence in Sri Lanka but in providing niche capabilities, technology, and practical solutions. India brings geographical proximity, political weight,and military-to-military engagement. Israel can contribute specialized expertise in maritime surveillance, cyber defense, AI, and critical-infrastructure protection. This does not require a formal India-Israel-Sri Lanka strategic triangle. A more realistic model would be functional trilateralism: concrete projects addressing Sri Lankan needs. The India-UAE-Sri Lanka cooperation around Trincomalee provides a useful precedent, illustrating that third-country participation can complement Indian interests rather than challenge them. Israel must also recognize Sri Lanka’s political sensitivities. Colombo has historically supported the Palestinian cause and continues to support a two-state solution. Treating Sri Lanka merely as another market for defense technology would therefore be politically shortsighted. A broader relationship combining agriculture, water, technology, trade, and carefully calibrated security cooperation would be more sustainable. The larger lesson extends beyond Sri Lanka. As India becomes more influential across the Indian Ocean, Israel should think about India not only as a bilateral strategic partner but also as a platform for regional cooperation. For decades, the focus has been on what India and Israel can do together. The next question is what their accumulated experience and complementary capabilities might allow them to do together elsewhere. Sri Lanka may be one of the best places to begin.