Группа государств Роговой Африки может стать более функциональным блоком, чем расширенная Восточноафриканская община

Key Takeaways: The East African Community’s rapid expansion has added members and geographical reach but strained the practical foundations of integration—financing, infrastructure, borders, and policy coordination—showing that size alone does not equal deeper economic or institutional cohesion. A smaller Horn of Africa States grouping (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia) could leverage strong economic complementarity: landlocked Ethiopia’s electricity, agriculture, industry, and large market paired with the coastal states’ ports, shipping, fisheries, and logistics, focused first on high-value transport and energy corridors. Success would depend on building political trust through practical, incremental measures (customs, electricity trade, joint infrastructure, dispute mechanisms) rather than ambitious political union, so that growing interdependence raises the cost of conflict and makes peace more profitable than confrontation. Let us face it. Regional integration in Africa can sometimes resemble a high-society wedding where everyone arrives for the injera with Doro wat, but nobody wants to stay behind to wash the dishes. For decades, the East African Community (EAC) was presented as one of the continent’s most promising integration projects. Its growing population, expanding market, and ambitious plans for deeper economic and political integration looked impressive on paper. But its experience also raises an important question. How much can a regional bloc expand before its ambitions begin to outrun its ability to integrate? The EAC’s rapid enlargement illustrates the problem. The admission of large and politically complex states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia has expanded the bloc’s geographical and strategic reach, but it has also added new political, security, economic, and institutional challenges.  The lesson is simple. Geographical expansion is not necessarily the same as meaningful integration. An organization can accumulate members, summits, flags, and declarations while still struggling with the less glamorous foundations of integration, reliable financing, functioning infrastructure, predictable borders, policy coordination, and public support. This raises an intriguing possibility. Could a smaller, more geographically concentrated bloc succeed where a larger one struggles? Enter the proposed Horn of Africa States (HAS), traditionally envisioned around Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. On a map, the Horn looks fragmented and intimidating. Its political history is equally complicated. Ethiopia and Eritrea have a painful history of conflict; Somalia has endured decades of instability; and Djibouti occupies a strategically sensitive position surrounded by major regional and global interests. Border disputes, competing ambitions, and mutual distrust have repeatedly frustrated regional cooperation. But this interconnectedness may also be the Horn’s greatest economic opportunity. The key advantage of a Horn-focused bloc would not be its size, but economic complementarity. Ethiopia is a vast, landlocked economy with a population exceeding 100 million, significant agricultural potential, renewable-energy resources, and an expanding industrial base. Its greatest geographical weakness is obvious. It needs reliable access to the sea. Its neighbors possess precisely what Ethiopia lacks. Djibouti is already a crucial maritime gateway for Ethiopian trade and has developed significant port and logistics infrastructure. Somalia possesses an enormous coastline and substantial maritime potential, while Eritrea has a Red Sea coastline and ports that could become important components of a diversified regional transport network. The economic logic is, therefore, compelling. Ethiopia can contribute electricity, agricultural products, manufacturing, labor, and a huge consumer market, while its coastal neighbors can provide ports, shipping, fisheries, logistics, and maritime services. You cannot eat a harbor, and you cannot sail a mountain. But connect the two, and both become more valuable. The goal should not be to make four countries produce the same things, as in East Africa Community, more efficiently. It should be to build an interconnected economic ecosystem in which each country’s comparative advantages reinforce the others. Geography provides another major advantage. The Horn sits beside one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. The Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and forms a crucial link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. That location gives the region enormous strategic importance. A successful HAS framework would, therefore, not need to integrate an enormous territory all at once. It could begin with a few high-value economic corridors connecting Ethiopia to deep-water ports in Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia. Lower transport costs would improve Ethiopia’s competitiveness, while greater cargo volumes would benefit coastal economies. Better roads, railways, ports, and energy networks would also attract investment and encourage manufacturing and logistics development along the corridors. The Horn’s infrastructure could consequently become more than an economic project. It could become a peace dividend. Economic interdependence does not automatically create peace, but it can change the incentives surrounding conflict. When countries depend on one another for electricity, ports, transit revenues, food, investment, and access to international markets, confrontation becomes more expensive. A regional institution could also provide a permanent forum for addressing border disputes, customs disagreements, transit fees, energy arrangements, and other tensions before they escalate. Internal disputes have also kept each of the four countries off balance. With limited economic opportunities and large, youthful populations, high unemployment, poverty, ethnic tensions, and political competition can easily fuel instability, often creating openings for external powers to exploit domestic divisions. A genuinely integrated Horn bloc could help change this dynamic. By expanding the regional economic pie through trade, infrastructure, investment, energy, and job creation, integration could provide greater opportunities for the region’s youth, reduce the socioeconomic pressures that drive political confrontation, and gradually strengthen stability within each of the four countries. The principle is straightforward. Peace becomes easier to defend when peace pays. A truck crossing a border, electricity moving through a transmission line, or cargo passing through a neighboring port creates businesses and communities that benefit from stability. Over time, these interests can become a counterweight to confrontation. But the greatest obstacle remains political trust. No institutional design can compensate for governments that fundamentally distrust one another. A customs union requires predictable borders, cross-border electricity requires confidence in agreements, shared infrastructure requires security, and investment requires stability. For this reason, a Horn bloc should resist the temptation to begin with grand declarations about federation or political union. It should start with practical measures that work, like simplified customs procedures, coordinated port systems, cross-border electricity agreements, joint infrastructure projects, mutual recognition of standards, investment protections, and reliable mechanisms for resolving commercial disputes. These initiatives may sound boring, but durable integration is usually built through boring things that function. In essence, the Horn can draw an important lesson from the EAC experience. Regional integration should not be measured by the number of countries around the table, but by the depth of their economic and institutional connections.  A smaller bloc with concentrated geography, complementary economies, and clearly defined priorities may have a better chance of achieving meaningful integration than a sprawling organization whose members possess widely different interests. That does not make the HAS project easy. Ethiopia would have to manage its regional ambitions carefully. Somalia would need continued improvements in security and governance. Eritrea would need to overcome its isolation, while Djibouti would need to balance its strategic importance with the interests of its neighbors.  All four would have to accept the difficult reality that integration requires giving up a measure of sovereignty in exchange for greater collective power. The Horn does not need to become Africa’s largest regional bloc. It could aim to become one of its most functional. The formula is simple. Ethiopia brings the electricity, agriculture, industry, and market, the coastal states bring ports, shipping, fisheries, and logistics, infrastructure connects them, institutions keep the system functioning, and trade gives everyone a reason to preserve the peace. They may not have to like one another. They simply have to discover that cooperation is more profitable than confrontation. Sometimes, in international politics, that is where the most durable partnerships begin.