Политический кризис в ЮАР: распад ANC и риск нестабильности перед выборами

I was recently reminded of a walking trip in the extreme north of Kruger National Park, a region famed for its baobab trees and as the place where elephants come to die. I recall lonely old bulls trudging along on their paths to death. It was sad, but also dignified, as these old behemoths saw out their twilight months with the same grace and power with which they carried themselves in their prime. I recalled this experience as I witnessed the ANC’s chaotic attempt to register candidates for the pending local government elections. Their opponents had already done so and were campaigning with the gusto these elections demanded. I greeted this with sadness too. Here was another dying old bull, one that had achieved much in an illustrious life. Missing, though, was the dignity with which the dying elephants comported themselves. Instead, the ANC’s impending demise resembles the delirious death throes of a shrunken old man, ravaged by pain, as his erstwhile comrades and family gathered around his bed, daggers drawn, eyeing the oxygen source, impatient to grab as large a share of the diminished estate as possible. Many greet the ANC’s decline as the harbinger of a glorious new age, rid at last of the dying beast. I, while sick of the cloying stench of death and cognisant of the damage done by this passage, am filled with trepidation. The ANC has stood in the foreground of South African history for 114 years and governed the country for the past 30. There isn’t an institution, public or private, untouched by it. What will fill the vacuum? I’ve no intention of writing an ANC obituary. This isn’t the first time the ANC has suffered a near-death experience. But I can’t see an easy way out for the old bull this time. A few veterans remain who testify to the quality of previous generations of leadership; some believe the “youth” will rescue the ANC, but that is a far-fetched prospect. Many greet the ANC’s decline as the harbinger of a glorious new age, rid at last of the dying beast. I, while sick of the cloying stench of death and cognisant of the damage done by this passage, am filled with trepidation. There are also bittereinders who will remain to switch off the lights. But engage them on a way forward and they seem as much at a loss as I am. So how did this happen? And what are the prospects for South Africa? Liberation movements are said to have an average postliberation lifespan of about 30 years. However, they tend to clash immediately with the democratic ideals they helped advance because the institutional character and conduct of an underground liberation struggle are largely the antithesis of a political party in a democracy. Communication between leadership and membership is sparse and sporadic; leadership elections and votes on critical policy developments are largely impossible, with differences resolved by bitter internal struggles and top-down decisions; there’s a strong imperative favouring a single liberation movement representing the nation, with opposition from alternative liberation movements deemed betrayal; secrecy is paramount, transparency an anathema; and the gravest danger is infiltration by spies. In short, the most complex and neglected postliberation transformation may be the transition from liberation movement to political party. The liberation movement’s claim to represent the nation ends when it enters the electoral realm. It now represents its share of the vote, which tends to decline rapidly; long-suppressed individual, ethnic, regional and class differences come to the fore, and these are manifest in other political parties which, through the electoral process, become legitimate contenders for power. In common with its fellow liberation movements, the ANC has failed to transition from liberation movement to political party. Attempts to do so were halted by Jacob Zuma’s election as party leader. His proclivity for top-down, secretive rule and contempt for oversight reflected the leadership style of the underground intelligence apparatchik he was. But he was not the whole problem. A topical example of the ANC leadership’s reluctance to accept its new status as a political party ― particularly its second tier ― is its refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the DA, evident in its regular characterisation of the party as “the party of apartheid”, a delegitimising label if ever there was one. However, the truth is that on the spectrum from centre-right (the DA) to centre-left (the ANC) there are few insurmountable policy differences. And so the election is largely fought on how efficiently each contender is expected to support basic liberal democratic rights, living standards and governance practices, and deliver public services. Both tick the box on democratic rights, but the ANC is widely deemed to have failed on sound governance and, hence, service delivery. The upshot will be a large, possibly decisive, number of former ANC voters across the class and race spectrum staying away from the polls or considering the DA. I thought the penny would drop when the ANC’s share of the national and metro votes sank below 50%. On the only measure of support that counts in a democracy, the ANC is clearly not the only game in town. While it remains the largest party in many major electoral contests, it no longer commands a majority in critical electorates. In most mature democracies this would see the centrist parties aligning with each other. While the formation of the government of national unity demonstrates that there are influential core groups within the ANC and DA that support an ANC-DA coalition, there are strong interests in each party that would prefer finding their political identity in the past. This is illustrated by the preference of strong ANC factions for aligning with their splinter parties, like the EFF and MK, and for the reluctance of DA factions to accommodate realities like race-based preferences in employment, university entrance and contracts with the state. We’re in for some rough times. The local government elections will give us an indication of just how rough and for how long. I think particularly of the Johannesburg election. If the polls are to be believed, a stable government of the centre will only be constituted by a coalition between the ANC and the DA. If they cannot form a coalition government, each (and certainly the ANC) will probably try to cobble together a government by seeking support from the splinter parties and tiny king-making parties. This will condemn us to another long period of unstable local government, with the predictable impact on democracy, governance practices, living standards and basic service delivery. For the ANC, failure to form a coalition with the DA leads to the graveyard of illustrious liberation movements; for the DA it’s the road to permanent opposition, at best. On the other hand, functioning ANC-DA coalitions in Johannesburg and the other large metros would constitute a way forward. It could also save the ANC’s bacon. It may ultimately even lead to the holy grail of party political realignment, with the centre of each leading party subsuming their preliberation identities in a new party of the centre. This would inevitably include small centrist parties such as Rise Mzansi, which can’t find a place in either the ANC or DA. The ANC’s left will join the South African Communist Party; the DA’s right will constitute itself on the populist right, but with little in common with other parties of the right such as the EFF and MK. So trudge on, Jumbo. You may have to sacrifice a remaining tusk, but you still have work to do. • Lewis, a former trade unionist, academic, policymaker, regulator and company board member, was a cofounder and director of Corruption Watch. Business Day